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The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in the Republic of Korea has provided an
opportunity to improve our understanding of the spread of MERS linked to healthcare settings. Here we
designed a dynamic transmission model to analyze the MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea based on
conﬁrmed cases reported during the period May 20–July 4, 2015. Our model explicitly incorporates
superspreading events and time-dependent transmission and isolation rates. Our model was able to
provide a good ﬁt to the trajectory of the outbreak and was useful to analyze the role of hypothetical
control scenarios. Speciﬁcally, we assessed the impact of the timing of control measures, especially as-
sociated with a reduction of the transmission rate and diagnostic delays on outbreak size and duration.
Early interventions within 1 week after the epidemic onset, for instance, including the initial government
announcement to the public about the list of hospitals exposed to MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV), show a
promising means to reduce the size (>71%) and duration (>35%) of the MERS epidemic. Finally, we also
present results of an uncertainty analysis focused on the role of superspreading events.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) is a fatal respiratory
disease caused by a coronavirus that emerged in Saudi Arabia in
2012 (Zaki et al., 2012). The major reservoir of MERS virus (MERS-
CoV) responsible for infections in the human population is likely to
be associated with dromedary camels (Cauchemez et al., 2014;
Zumla et al., 2015; Sabir et al., 2015). Most individuals infected
with MERS-CoV develop a severe respiratory illness accompanied
by cough, fever, shortness of breath, and pneumonia. As of 28 July
2016, a total of 1791 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases including 640Ltd. This is an open access article u
(E. Jung).deaths in 27 countries have been reported to the World Health
Organization (WHO) (World Health Organization, 2015c). Al-
though countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America have
experienced sporadic importations of MERS from the Middle East,
these have not generated local outbreaks thus far. The largest
MERS outbreak outside Saudi Arabia occurred in the Republic of
Korea as a result of a single importation from the Arabian Pe-
ninsula in May 2015. As of 4 July 2015, a total of 186 cases have
been reported, including 38 deaths.
Although the person-to-person transmission risk of MERS is
thought to be not self-sustaining (Cauchemez et al., 2014; The
Health Protection Agency (HPA) UK Novel Coronavirus Investiga-
tion team, 2013; Chowell et al., 2014; Breban et al., 2013), it has
shown potential to be explosive in the nosocomial setting (Assiri
et al., 2013; Oboho et al., 2015). Out of 186 conﬁrmed cases in thender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Schematic timeline for the two superspreaders (Case 14 and Case 16) in the MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea in 2015. The thick bar indicates the date of
symptom onset, and the gray diagonal patterned square represents the duration of exposure when the superspreader with symptoms visited or stayed in hospitals. The
arrowhead represents the date of conﬁrmation. The length of the arrow means the duration from symptom onset to conﬁrmation. The dashed line means the transmission
route from the index case to Case 14 and Case 16.
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transmission in 17 MERS-affected healthcare facilities (Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015, 2016; Ki, 2015)
and 80 cases (43%) were generated by only one infected case at the
same hospital (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2015, 2016) (Fig. 1).
The potential for high variability in the number of secondary
cases or superspreading events (SSEs) is a notable characteristic of
infectious diseases (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2005; Galvani and May,
2005). Cases that generate a disproportionate number of second-
ary cases tend to occur during the early stage of an epidemic
(Transmission Dynamics and Control of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome, 2003; Goh et al., 2006). Conversely, unlike “super-
spreaders”, the typical individuals tend to infect only a few or no
cases at all. In recent works on the MERS outbreak (Chowell et al.,
2015; Nishiura et al., 2015; Kucharski and Althaus, 2015; Blumberg
and Lloyd-Smith, 2013), this individual variation has been de-
scribed by transmission heterogeneity. Based on the stochastic
approach, it is assumed that the number of secondary cases caused
by each infected individual is negative binomial distributed with
mean 09 and dispersion parameter k (with lower value re-
presenting higher heterogeneity, and vice versa). In this frame-
work, SSEs during the recent MERS outbreaks can be explained by
the high dispersion nature of the distribution of the number of
secondary cases per case. For example, Chowell et al. (2015) esti-
mated that the mean 09 for the MERS outbreaks was below the
epidemic threshold value of 1 while the dispersion parameter k
was estimated at 0.06, indicating high heterogeneity in the po-
tential number of secondary cases. Simulations indicated that the
probability of observing outbreaks larger than the MERS outbreak
in the Republic of Korea is only of the order of 1%. However, this
requires careful interpretation because SSEs during outbreaks
might be treated as outliers rather than observations stemming
from a highly over dispersed distribution. At the same time, in-
fectious diseases with subcritical 09 and overdispersed k are more
likely to subside within just a few disease generations.
Currently, no vaccine or antiviral treatment against MERS-CoV
infection (World Health Organization, 2015b) is available. Al-
though early intervention strategies such as fast diagnosis and
quarantine of suspected cases have proved to be the most effective
control measures for rapidly mitigating a MERS outbreak (The
Health Protection Agency (HPA) UK Novel Coronavirus Investiga-
tion team, 2013; Breban et al., 2013; Nishiura et al., 2015; Ku-
charski and Althaus, 2015; Banik et al., 2015). The mean duration
from symptom onset to diagnosis of MERS-CoV infection of the
outbreak in the Republic of Korea was estimated in the range of 4–
8 days (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Ki,
2015; Cowling et al., 2015). Although it decreased once intensecontact tracing activities were implemented, a signiﬁcant delay in
diagnosis was observed in the early stage of the outbreak in the
Republic of Korea, which is one of the critical features that fa-
cilitated the outbreak.
Most studies on the MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea
have focused on inferring the probability of a large outbreak size
by analyzing the distribution of cluster sizes (Nishiura et al., 2015;
Kucharski and Althaus, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, there
is no dynamic compartmental model for the MERS outbreak in the
Republic of Korea that incorporates the role of SSEs and the time-
dependent parameters associated with the impact of early inter-
ventions. In this work, we develop a mathematical model that is
consistent with consolidated retrospective investigations of pre-
vious MERS outbreaks. Our calibrated model provides a basis to
analyze the hypothetical impact of intervention strategies. Fur-
thermore, by analyzing the variation in infectiousness of the su-
perspreaders, we explore the uncertainty associated with the SSEs.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Epidemic data
Data on daily laboratory-conﬁrmed MERS cases for the out-
break in the Republic of Korea were obtained from the Korea
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) (Korea Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). The KCDC reported 186
cases including a case conﬁrmed in China and 38 deaths since May
20, 2015, which is the day the index case was conﬁrmed. No ad-
ditional conﬁrmed cases have been reported since 4 July, and the
Korean government declared the end of MERS-CoV transmission in
the Republic of Korea on December 23, 2015 by WHO standards
(Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).
The index case of the MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea
was a businessman who took a trip to the Middle East and re-
turned on May 4 (Chowell et al., 2015; Cowling et al., 2015; World
Health Organization, 2015a). Showing symptoms of respiratory
problems on May 11, he visited several hospitals, was admitted to
a hospital on May 15 and discharged on May 17, and ﬁnally di-
agnosed with MERS on May 20. Consequently, the index case
generated multiple exposures, infecting 28 people including the
two patients, Case 14 and Case 16, who in turn generated over 50%
of the total cases reported in the Republic of Korea.
Most cases were related to nosocomial transmission or hospi-
tal-to-hospital transmission in 17 MERS-affected healthcare
facilities (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015,
2016; Ki, 2015). Of the 186 cases, 82 were inpatients who shared
the same room, ward, or emergency room; 65 were their family
Fig. 2. Flow chart of the transmission dynamics for MERS with the superspreaders.
The red dashed line represents the force of infection by superspreaders. (For in-
terpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to
the web version of this paper.)
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number of cases had been exposed in badly ventilated and crow-
ded places such as the emergency room with unisolated patients
who had respiratory diseases. More than three healthcare workers
were infected by conﬁrmed cases when providing treatment
without wearing proper personal protective equipment.
In our study, we developed a model for the MERS outbreak in
the nosocomial setting and investigated the role of superspreaders
in the transmission dynamics. We deﬁned the superspreaders as
those who transmit the virus to more than 20 patients and have
underlying respiratory diseases with a severe cough (Korea Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Ki, 2015). Case 14
and Case 16 were considered to be “superspreaders” in our model
(see Fig. 1). Because our model was simulated based on the data
according to the day of lab-conﬁrmation, 28 cases exposed by the
index case before May 20, the day on which our simulations start,
were used as initial conditions. Case 14 and Case 16 were in-
patients staying with the index case in the same ward at Pyeng-
taek St. Mary's Hospital and were exposed to MERS-CoV infection
from May 15 to 17. Developing MERS-CoV symptoms with fever,
Case 14 visited the emergency room at Samsung Medical Center
on May 27 and stayed there for 3 days before he was conﬁrmed on
May 30. During this period, 80 tertiary cases—approximately 43%
of the total cases of MERS-CoV infection in the Republic of Korea—
were infected in the same hospital by Case 14. Case 16 developed
symptoms on May 20, and he generated a total of 24 tertiary in-
fections at Dae Cheong Hospital and Konyang University Hospital
from May 22 to 30. These two large clusters in the nosocomial
setting caused the epidemic peak on June 7.
2.2. Mathematical model of the MERS outbreak incorporating the
SSEs
We developed a dynamic transmission model for the MERS
outbreak in the Republic of Korea based on a SEIR compartmental
modeling framework that incorporates time-dependent para-
meters and pulses of intensiﬁed transmission that captures SSEs.
We assumed a nosocomial infection in our model. The entire po-
pulation stays at hospitals and consists of ﬁve epidemiological
compartments: susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I), isolated
(J), and removed (R). Therefore, people who stay in a hospital and
are not exposed to MERS are susceptible individuals, S, such as
inpatients, outpatients, family members, healthcare workers, or
visitors. The susceptible individuals, S, who have effective contacts
with the infected individuals, I, J, and the superspreaders, are ex-
posed to MERS-CoV. Following the mean incubation period, k1/ ,
the exposed individuals, E, show symptoms and become infectious
individuals, I. Note that, in this phase, people with illness might
not be entirely under isolation before the case conﬁrmation by
laboratory means. After showing symptoms for a mean duration of
α1/ days, patients would be classiﬁed as laboratory-conﬁrmed
cases, J. Then, these individuals are immediately transferred to
hospitals for MERS-CoV treatment and are isolated in an intensive
care unit which is restricted to only healthcare staff with personalprotective equipment (Korea Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2016). The isolated individuals, J, are discharged from
the hospital as cured or dead after γ1/ days on average. The
transmission dynamics of MERS-CoV shown in Fig. 2 is then
modeled by the following system of nonlinear ordinary differential
equations:
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where N is the total population, and H(t) is a heaviside function.
In this model, there are three ways that the pathogen spreads
to the host population: by infectious individuals, isolated in-
dividuals, and superspreaders. The I class, who has common initial
symptoms including fever, cough, and myalgia, would be mis-
diagnosed as having a common cold in the beginning of an out-
break for emerging infectious diseases such as the MERS epidemic
in the Republic of Korea. Because the I class is likely to be isolated
improperly, in the nosocomial setting, it can transmit the virus to
the S class at transmission rate β. Although the J class is isolated to
a negative-pressure room, a few of its members could transmit the
virus, by accident, to other people such as healthcare workers. We
assumed that they have less infectiousness with the reduction
factor l. Hence, the force of infection by I and J is deﬁned by
λ β( ) = ( )( + )t t I lJ N/ .
Since the superspreaders played a major role for the MERS out-
break in the Republic of Korea, we considered the force of infection
by superspreaders separately in our model. The superspreaders
have abnormally high transmissibility because of bad circum-
stances and personal health status, such as poor ventilation in a
ward and excessive clinical symptoms including cough (Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Chowell et al.,
2015; Stein, 2011). This transmission heterogeneity was determi-
nistically incorporated with a heaviside function during a speciﬁc
time interval, δti, representing the exposed period of the i-th SSE
beginning at time ti. The force of infection by the i-th super-
spreader is then given by
( )λ β δ*( ) = * ( − ) − ( − ( + ))t H t t H t t t N/ ,i i i i i
where β*i is the individual transmission rate for the i-th super-
spreader. Note that the probability that a susceptible individual
may have contact with a certain superspreader among the total
population N is considered by
N
1 .
Control measures by the government and behavioral changes in
communities cause the transmission and isolation rates over time
to vary. We considered that the transmission rate, β ( )t , and iso-
lation rate, α ( )t , are both deﬁned as a step function, allowing the
changes at τ days after the onset of the outbreak, as follows:
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where τ is the time when interventions start. Note that β β>pre post
and α α<pre post (see Table 1).
The SSE by the index case was imposed on the initial condition
for the MERS model (1). Because the model was ﬁtted to the data
Table 1
Epidemiological parameters.
Symbol Description Baseline value Sources
βpre Transmission rate during pre-intervention 0.085 (1/days) Data ﬁtting
βpost Transmission rate during post-intervention 0.041 (1/days) Data ﬁtting
*19 Secondary cases reproduced by Case 14 80 Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
*29 Secondary cases reproduced by Case 16 24 Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
t1 Starting time of the ﬁrst SSE (after the outbreak onset) 7 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
t2 Starting time of the second SSE (after the outbreak
onset)
2 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
δt1 Duration of exposure by Case 14 3 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
δt2 Duration of exposure by Case 16 8 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015)
l Contact reduction of isolated individuals after the case
is conﬁrmed
0.1 Assumed
k1/ Mean incubation period 6.83 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015), Cho and Chu (2015)
α1/ pre Mean duration from illness onset to diagnosis during
pre-intervention
6 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016), Ki (2015)
α1/ post Mean duration from illness onset to diagnosis during
post-intervention
2 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016), Ki (2015)
γ1/ Mean period of hospital stay 13 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2016)
τ Time when interventions are carried out (after the
outbreak onset)
18 (days) Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2015, 2016), Cho and Chu (2015)
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erated by the index case were considered in the initial condition.
The ﬁrst and second conﬁrmed cases were reported on May 20,
2015. At that time, it was revealed by the KCDC's epidemiological
investigation that, of 28 secondary cases, 16 were exposed and 10
were infected (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2015). Therefore, assuming that there was a total of 10,000 people
in healthcare facilities, we set the initial values as
( ) = − ( ) − ( ) − ( )S E I J0 10, 000 0 0 0 , ( ) =E 0 16, ( ) =I 0 10, ( ) =J 0 2,
( ) =R 0 0.
2.3. Parameter estimation
In this work, most of the parameters were referred from the
report of the KCDC's epidemiological investigation of the MERS
outbreak (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).
The mean incubation period, 1/k, was chosen as 6.83 days (Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Ki, 2015;
Cowling et al., 2015; Cho and Chu, 2015; Park et al., 2015). The
mean period from isolation to discharge, 1/γ, was estimated at 13
days, which is the median for all discharged cases. The transmis-
sion rate of the isolated individuals, J, was assumed as 10% of that
of the infectious individuals, I. Therefore, the reduction factor for
the transmissibility of J was set at l¼0.1.
The time when the levels of α ( )t and β ( )t are changed, τ, was
estimated at 18 days after the outbreak onset, based on the case
data for the duration from symptom onset to conﬁrmation (Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016; Ki, 2015). At that
time, the government announced the list of hospitals exposed to
MERS (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016;
Cho and Chu, 2015), so people in the community or at these
hospitals paid more attention to the spread of MERS. Empirical
evidence indicates that behavioral changes could make the noso-
comial transmissibility decrease signiﬁcantly (Wallinga and Teu-
nis, 2004). Additionally, the government allowed the diagnostic
testing for MERS to be performed at authorized health facilities in
order to shorten the duration of diagnosis (Cho and Chu, 2015).
The median value of duration from symptom onset to laboratory
conﬁrmation was signiﬁcantly shortened after June 7 (from 6 days
to 2 days).
The time-dependent transmission rate, β ( )t , was estimated by
ﬁtting the model prediction, ∫ α( ) = ( ) ( )C t s I s dsI tdef 0 , to the observed
cumulative number of conﬁrmed cases. Using the MATLAB routinelsqcurveﬁt, which solves nonlinear least squares problems, we
obtained the data-ﬁtted transmission rates as β = 0.085pre (95% CI:
0.0760–0.0937) and β = 0.041post (95% CI: 0.0246–0.0579).
The individual transmission rate for the i-th superspreader, β*i ,
was obtained from the relation between the individual re-
productive number for the i-th superspreader, *i9 , and the dura-
tion of exposure by the i-th superspreader, δti, i.e., β δ* = * t/i i i9 . We
estimated *i9 as the number of secondary cases in the i-th SSE. δti
was not estimated as an infectious period of the i-th super-
spreader, but as the duration of exposure when effective contacts
occurred in the nosocomial setting. These were obtained from the
results of the KCDC's epidemiological investigation (Korea Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015): * =R 801 during δ =t 31
days and * =R 242 during δ =t 82 days (see Fig. 1).
The basic reproductive number gives us the information whe-
ther an infectious disease can spread to a susceptible population in
a steady state (Diekmann et al., 1990). Generally, 09 could be
obtained from the generation matrix for a compartmental disease
transmission model (Van Den Driessche and Watmough, 2002). In
this work we estimate the effective reproductive number, e9 ,
which is the time-dependent reproductive number reﬂecting the
impact of control measures (Nishiura and Chowell, 2009).
For our model (1), the effective reproductive number without
the pulse of infection is given by
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟β α γ( ) = ( )
( )
( ) ( )
+
( )
t t
S t
N t t
l1
.
2
e9
We estimated ( ) <t 1e9 for all >t 0 (Fig. 3).
2.4. Early interventions
To investigate the effects of early interventions, we varied τ and
ﬁxed the estimated values of associated parameters with β ( )t and
α ( )t as the baseline values in Table 1. The total number of con-
ﬁrmed cases and the duration of the outbreak were investigated
by varying τ from 1 to 18. The outbreak duration was measured
during times until the daily number of new conﬁrmed cases was
decreasing and sufﬁciently small. The proportionate reductions of
the outbreak duration and size were calculated by using the
baseline results at τ = 18. We assumed that the control measures
for β ( )t and α ( )t were effectively carried out to prevent trans-
mission of the virus. For example, the list of hospitals that were
exposed to MERS patients was announced to the public on June 7.
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J. Lee et al. / Journal of Theoretical Biology 408 (2016) 118–126122After that, people changed their behaviors such as avoiding visit-
ing hospitals, wearing an N95 mask, and using hand sanitizers. At
that time, the health authorities expanded the screening capacity
for rapid diagnosis. These control measures could help detect
suspected cases during their infectious period or even before the
onset of symptoms. Such interventions could prevent the occur-
rence of SSEs because the potential superspreaders were im-
mediately isolated after being conﬁrmed with MERS infection.
2.5. Probability distributions for the SSEs
We investigated the uncertainty of SSEs by using the prob-
ability distributions for the timing and size of the events. SSEs tend
to occur during the early stage of an outbreak when the presence
of disease is not yet identiﬁed by public health authorities (Lloyd-
Smith et al., 2005). If identiﬁcation of the superspreaders is de-
layed, a substantially large number of cases proportional to the
duration of exposure are likely to be generated. Hence, we as-
sumed that potential SSEs occur during the ﬁrst few days of the
introduction of the disease. This allows for variations in the timing
of occurrence of the SSE and in the sizes of secondary cases pro-
duced by a superspreader while the duration of exposure was
predetermined in simulations.
To investigate the uncertainty of SSEs, we assumed the number
of secondary cases by the superspreaders as a uniform distribution
in the range of [ ] × *0.5, 1.5 i9 . The truncated exponential decay
distribution was used for the beginning of a SSE. The two super-
spreaders, Case 14 and Case 16, were exposed by the index case on
May 17. Adding the maximum value of the incubation period, 14
days, to the illness onset of the superspreaders, we found the
feasible periods for the truncated interval of the exponential decay
distribution. Because the outbreak began on May 20 (i.e., t¼0), the
truncated interval was determined as [ ]1, 11 . However, different
mean values for the exponential distribution were used in order to
consider the individual variability of the SSE (see Supplementary
Figure S1). Note that the abbreviations ‘SSE 1′ and ‘SSE 2′ denote
the SSEs caused by Case 14 and Case 16, respectively.0
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3.1. Model ﬁtting
The ﬁt of the model to the temporal evolution of the MERS
outbreak in the Republic of Korea from May 20 is shown in Fig. 4.
The daily and cumulative numbers of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases
for MERS-CoV from our model (solid curves) showed qualitatively
good ﬁt to the data (squares) because the effects of superspreaders
were applied to the model at appropriate times. Our calibrated
model indicates that the epidemic reached its peak on June 7, then
gradually decreased to zero as in the real data. In Hsieh (2015), the
author deduced that May 27–29 was the period of the turning
point for disease infection and the serial interval for the MERS
outbreak was estimated as 12.5 days in Korea Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (2015). Then the turning point for the
conﬁrmed cases might have occurred during June 8–10. This is
similar to the peak of incidence (conﬁrmed cases) by the two su-
perspreaders on June 7.
3.2. Effects of the early interventions
The impact of the control measures was investigated by varying
the parameter τ, which plays an important role in the time-de-
pendent parameters, α ( )t and β ( )t . Fig. 5 shows the impact of τ on
the outbreak size and duration. In Fig. 5(A), the cumulative num-
bers of cases as functions of time after onset are shown for the
baseline value, τ = 18 (thick black curve), and smaller values,
τ≤ ≤1 17 (thin gray curves). The proportionate reductions of
outbreak size (cross) and outbreak duration (square) with respect
to τ are plotted in Fig. 5(B). For the baseline value, τ = 18, the
outbreak size and duration were 188.7 total cases and 64.9 days,
respectively. At a glance, smaller values of τ than the baseline
value shows a decreasing effect on outbreak size and duration.
Especially, when τ ≤ 7, the outbreak sizes are less than 60 total
cases (>71% reduction) and the outbreak durations are within 50
days ( >35% reduction). This result suggests how important the
early interventions were in mitigating the MERS outbreak in the
Republic of Korea. For instance, if the government had announced
the list of MERS-exposed hospitals to the public less than 1 week
after the onset, the outbreak size might have been dramatically
reduced.
3.3. Uncertainty analysis of the SSEs
The uncertainty of the SSEs was investigated by drawing the
size of SSE from a uniform distribution and/or the timing of the
events from a truncated exponential distribution. Fig. 6 shows the
distributions of outbreak duration and size obtained from the si-
mulations, allowing the variation in the size and initial timing for
the occurrence of the SSE when τ = 18 (top) and τ = 11 (bottom).0
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(cross) and outbreak duration (square) with respect to τ are plotted.
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Fig. 6. Distributions of the outbreak duration and size obtained from the simula-
tions, allowing the variation in the size and initial timing of the occurrence of SSE
when τ = 18 (A) and τ = 11 (B). The different distributions of SSE 1 only (black dot),
SSE 2 only (green cross), and both (blue plus) are shown. The yellow square re-
presents the outbreak duration and size from the model (1) with baseline para-
meters. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the
reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
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Fig. 7. Scatterplots of the outbreak duration (A) and size (B) when τ = 18 days. The
data set consists of a set of the initial timing of the SSE and the number of sec-
ondary cases caused by the SSE, and the corresponding outbreak duration or size.
The different distributions of SSE 1 only (black dot) and SSE 2 only (green cross) are
shown with those interpolants (gray). (For interpretation of the references to color
in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
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(green cross), and both (blue plus) are shown. The yellow square
represents the outbreak duration and size from the model (1) with
baseline parameters.
The mean values of the outbreak duration and size for the case
of SSE 1 and SSE 2 are approximately 64 days and 193 total cases at
τ = 18, respectively, which are similar to those obtained from the
baseline parameter. If there exists only one superspreader, thenthe mean outbreak duration and size are 61 days and 159 total
cases for SSE 1, and 52 days and 80 total cases for SSE 2, respec-
tively (Table 2).
If the intervention is put in place a week earlier, τ = 11, then
late-occurring SSEs are avoided and most outbreaks end with
signiﬁcant reductions in its duration and size. If there exists only
one superspreader, the mean outbreak duration and size are 56
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Fig. 8. Scatterplots of the outbreak duration (A) and size (B) when τ = 11 days. The
data set consists of a set of the initial timing of the SSE and the number of sec-
ondary cases caused by the SSE, and the corresponding outbreak duration or size.
The different distributions of SSE 1 only (black dot) and SSE 2 only (green cross) are
shownwith those interpolants (gray). Red curves highlight the considerable change
during days when the sum of the initial timing of the SSE and its duration of ex-
posure are equal to the intervention starting time, i.e., δ τ+ =t ti i . (For interpreta-
tion of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the
web version of this paper.)
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for SSE 2, respectively. If there exist both SSE 1 and SSE 2, the
mean outbreak duration and size are 58 days and 158 total size,
respectively (Table 2). We found that 74.5% of the simulated out-
breaks with both SSE 1 and SSE 2 had a shorter duration and a
smaller size than the baseline (a yellow square in Fig. 6). Notably,
about 8% of the simulated outbreaks with both SSE 1 and SSE 2 are
of duration <55 days and of size <100 total cases.
Scatterplots of the outbreak duration (A) and size (B) are shown
when τ = 18 days (Fig. 7) and τ = 11days (Fig. 8). The set of control
parameters was obtained from the joint distribution for the initial
timing of the SSE and the size of secondary cases by the SSEs. TheTable 2
Expected outbreak duration and size derived from the uncertainty analysis on the SSE.
Scenario 1
Intervention starting time June 7 (τ = 18)
Type of SSE SSE 1 SSE 2
Mean outbreak duration (SD) 61 (3.1) 52 (2.0)
Mean outbreak size (SD) 159 (33.7) 80 (10.3)different distributions of SSE 1 only (black dot) and SSE 2 only
(green cross) are shown with those interpolants (gray). The red
curve in Fig. 8 highlights the considerable change during days
when the sum of the initial timing of the SSE and its duration of
exposure is equal to the intervention starting time, i.e., δ τ+ =t ti i .
Overall, the outbreak duration and size were positively correlated
with the number of secondary cases stemming from the SSEs.
Although the outbreak duration was positively correlated with the
timing of the SSEs, the outbreak size was negatively correlated
with one. When the control measures to contain more infections
by the SSE were implemented in the early stage of the spread of
MERS ( τ = 11), the outbreak duration and size were remarkably
reduced.4. Discussion
We have developed a mathematical model for the 2015 MERS
outbreak in the Republic of Korea, incorporating the time-depen-
dent parameters and the pulse of infections to model SSEs. As-
suming a nosocomial setting, the pulse of infection with different
transmission rates for the SSEs was incorporated in the determi-
nistic model. Laboratory-conﬁrmed data (Korea Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, 2015, 2016) were used to estimate
the transmission rates for the typical infectious individuals and the
superspreaders. To the best of knowledge, this is the ﬁrst dynamic
compartmental model incorporating pulses of infections to model
the effect of SSEs.
We estimated e9 regardless of SSEs was below 1, which is
consistent with previous works on the recent MERS outbreak
(Cauchemez et al., 2014; Chowell et al., 2014, 2015; Breban et al.,
2013; Cowling et al., 2015; Majumder et al., 2014). Moreover, the
estimated e9 after the control measures were implemented was
substantially decreased. This indicates that the MERS outbreak in
the Republic of Korea had a low transmissibility in the absence of
the SSEs (Cowling et al., 2015). However, the reasons for the
emergence of the biggest outbreak outside the Middle East are
attributed to the importation of the virus without awareness of the
public health (Nishiura et al., 2015), missed contacts (Cho and Chu,
2015), substantial exposure to infection (δt2) caused by delayed
diagnosis and isolation (Park et al., 2015), and abnormally high
contact rate of the superspreaders ( β*i ) in the crowded hospital
setting (Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).
Of 186 conﬁrmed cases with MERS-CoV infection in the Republic
of Korea, 153 cases (82.3%) were generated by only 5 cases (2.7%).
Conversely, this transmission heterogeneity suggests that identi-
fying them in their suspected stage of MERS-CoV infection could
stem the subsequent transmission in over 150 cases in the host
population (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2005; Galvani and May, 2005;
Stein, 2011).
We paid attention to the timing of implementation of control
measures associated with the reduction in transmission rate β and
diagnostic delay α1/ . Quarantine and isolation turned out to be
highly effective control measures for reducing the transmission
rate. Our results show that the intervention strategies in the early
stage of the outbreak (τ ≤ 7) could prevent the occurrence of SSEsScenario 2
May 31 (τ = 11)
Both SSE 1 SSE 2 Both
64 (2.6) 56 (4.0) 46 (2.2) 58 (3.8)
193 (35.4) 131 (34.8) 67 (9.8) 158 (38.9)
J. Lee et al. / Journal of Theoretical Biology 408 (2016) 118–126 125and substantially reduce the outbreak duration and size. In other
words, the failure of rapid detection and proper isolation of sus-
pected patients early in the outbreak has contributed to SSEs,
which is in line with the experience of the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 (Galvani and May, 2005; Goh
et al., 2006; McDonald et al., 2004). Our results derived from the
uncertainty analysis of the SSEs suggest that the recent MERS
outbreak in the Republic of Korea could have been smaller in size
and duration. When τ = 11, it is very likely that outbreaks with
both SSE 1 and SSE 2 have a shorter duration and a smaller size
(with mean 58 days and 158 cases, respectively) compared to the
baseline outcome.
Although it is certainly difﬁcult to preemptively identify su-
perspreaders, the implementation of timely interventions (e.g. fast
diagnosis and quarantine of suspected cases) can signiﬁcantly
mitigate the chance of SSEs during an outbreak. Case 14 and Case
16 were not classiﬁed as suspected cases but should have been
home-quarantined as soon as they were exposed to MERS-CoV by
the index case. Furthermore, the diagnostic delay in nosocomial
infection made them become superspreaders. After the health
authorities implemented the strong control measures such as
contact tracing using CCTV surveillance and the GPS of mobile
phones, the conﬁrmed cases who were not identiﬁed in the con-
tact tracing gradually decreased since June 12 (Cho and Chu, 2015).
Our results suggest the importance of the early implementation of
such interventions in the rapid containment of the SSEs and,
consequently, in the remarkable reduction in outbreak duration
and size.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst dynamic com-
partmental model that explores the nosocomial outbreak of the
MERS-CoV in the Republic of Korea including the SSEs. The out-
break pattern in our results shows a good agreement with the time
series of conﬁrmed cases. This implies that our model has cap-
tured the contributing main factors such as the delayed diagnosis
and the announcement to the public of the list of exposed hospi-
tals during the early phase of the outbreak. This result suggests
that our modeling framework could be a useful tool for the pre-
diction or prevention of future emerging infectious diseases that
have similar characteristics to MERS-CoV infection in the Republic
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